Division of Labor between Arkansas\u27s Appellate Courts by Watkins, John J.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 17 




Division of Labor between Arkansas's Appellate Courts 
John J. Watkins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John J. Watkins, Division of Labor between Arkansas's Appellate Courts, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
177 (1995). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN ARKANSAS'S APPELLATE
COURTS
John J. Watkins*
Throughout most of its history, Arkansas has had only a single
appellate court with statewide jurisdiction. The Arkansas Supreme
Court, which replaced the superior court that had existed during
territorial days,' carried the burden alone for more than 140 years:
from 1836, when it was created under the state's first constitution, 2
until 1979, when the six-judge Arkansas Court of Appeals was
established pursuant to a constitutional amendment approved the
previous year.3
The creation of the intermediate appellate court was a response
to the supreme court's increasingly heavy workload.4 Today, the
state's two appellate courts face another "crisis of volume." 5 In
fiscal year 1992-93, there were as many appeals filed in the supreme
court as in the 1978 calendar year, the last before the court of
appeals began to hear cases. 6 Total appellate filings in the state more
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. The author gratefully
acknowledges the financial support of the Arkansas Bar Foundation and the research
assistance of Liz Dowling of the Administrative Office of the Courts and Claudia
Driver of the Young Law Library.
1. See Act Establishing the Territory of Arkansas, ch. 49, 3 Stat. 493, 495
(1819). The court initially consisted of three judges. Two of the original appointees
left Arkansas before assuming the bench, having found "frontier life in the territory
too rugged and severe." Oscar Fendler, The Arkansas Judicial System at the
Crossroads, 17 ARK. L. REV. 259, 261 (1963).
2. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VI, § 2. For the present jurisdictional provision,
see ARK. CONrST. art. 7, § 4. The court initially had three judges, but the number
has been set at seven since 1927. See Act of Mar. 21, 1925, No. 205, § 1, 1925
Ark. Acts 597, 597 (adopted pursuant to ARK. CONST. amend. IX, § 1); Edwin
H. Greenebaum, Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 ARK. L. REV.
152, 157 (1964).
3. ARK. CONST. amend. LVIII (approved Nov. 7, 1978); Act of Feb. 23, 1979,
No. 208, 1979 Ark. Acts 467. The enabling legislation is codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-12-101 to -114 (Michie 1994).
4. See Report on Proposed Amendment No. 58, 12 ARK. LAW. 160, 161 (Oct.
1978) (arguing that supreme court was at "breaking point" at which additional
cases "just can't be handled").
5. See In re Ark. Bar Ass'n Comm., 303 Ark. 752, 798 S.W.2d 923 (1990)
(describing increase in appellate filings from 1978 to 1990 and suggesting that
caseload may soon become unmanageable). The phrase "crisis of volume" has
been frequently used to describe the steadily increasing caseloads in state appellate
courts. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION 11 (1988).
6. Filings totaled 514 in fiscal year 1992-93, compared to 516 in calendar year
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than tripled during this period and increased by 26.5 percent from
fiscal year 1987-88 to fiscal year 1992-93. 7 While the supreme court
has managed to keep its docket current, the court of appeals faces
a significant backlog: 448 cases as of April 30, 1994.8
To avoid delay in the disposition of appeals, the supreme court
decides cases at a rapid pace. On average, the court hands down
a decision approximately two weeks after submission. 9 This method
of keeping current, while successful, is not without cost. The judicial
decision making process suffers when judges have precious little time
for reflection and contemplation, not to mention independent re-
search. Opinions are often short on analysis and reasoning, language
is sometimes employed carelessly, and ramifications of a particular
holding are not always fully considered.' 0 By providing little guidance
1978. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ARKANSAS
JUDICIARY, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 1 (1992-93); JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS,
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1978). Judicial statistics in Arkansas were reported
on a calendar year basis from 1964 to 1982. After a transition period during the
first six months of 1983, a fiscal year format was employed. The Administrative
Office of the Courts, which compiles the statistics, is the successor to the Judicial
Department. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-102 & Publisher's Notes (Michie 1994).
7. There were 516 appeals filed during calendar year 1978, compared to 1,643
in fiscal year 1992-93. Of the latter group, 514 were filed in the supreme court
and 1,129 in the court of appeals. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1978), supra note
6, at 9; ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6, at 1,
5. In fiscal year 1987-88, appeals filed in both courts totalled 1,299, of which 400
were in the supreme court. JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
JUDICIARY OF ARKANSAS 37, 39 (1987-88).
The Arkansas experience is consistent with the national trend. Since the Second
World War, state appellate caseloads have on average doubled every ten years.
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION, supra note 5, at 11. During
the period 1987-1992, appellate filings nationally rose from 208,962 to 259,276, an
increase of 24.1 percent. NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATTSTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1987 53 (1989); NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992 51 (1994).
8. ARKANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL LONG RANGE PLANNING COMMITTEE, REPORT
OF THE APPELLATE COURTS SUBCOMMITTEE 5 (1994).
9. In 1992-93, the average was 11 days in criminal cases, 17 days in civil cases.
The court of appeals averaged 22 and 27 days, respectively. ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, ARKANSAS JUDICIARY ANNUAL REPORT 4, 6 (1992-93). According to
one member of the supreme court, "in the majority of cases the justices write
their opinions over . . . two and one-half days." Robert L. Brown, From Lawyerin'
to Judgin': Life on the Supreme Court After a Year and a Half, ARK. LAW.,
July 1992, at 44, 45. By way of comparison, the American Bar Association standard
for opinion preparation is 60 days from the date of oral argument or assignment
(90 days in death penalty cases and cases of "extraordinary complexity"), plus an
additional 20 days for voting on opinions that have been circulated (30 days if a
written dissent is filed). STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY REDUCTION,
supra note 5, at 19-20.
10. For discussion of two cases that exemplify these problems, see Robert
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for the bench and bar or by sending mixed messages, these opinions
may diminish the legitimacy and acceptability of judicial decisions
and breed further litigation."
Moreover, because its caseload is heavy and its jurisdiction
almost entirely mandatory, the supreme court cannot adequately
perform the major function of an appellate court of last resort:
development of the law in an orderly and coherent manner. Simply
put, the justices cannot focus their energies on the cases that pose
questions of great public interest or present issues of significance
to the legal order and the evolution of the law. In some states, an
intermediate appellate court serves as "a buffer, a breakwater against
which the tidal waves of appeals spend themselves, leaving the top
court protected in quieter waters to deliberate on specially important
questions."'1 2 Under the present Arkansas arrangement, however, the
court of appeals is in no position to play such a protective role,
and the supreme court finds itself on an open sea.
What can be done to eliminate, or at least minimize, these
problems? The General Assembly has taken the first step by ex-
panding the court of appeals to twelve judges, effective July 1,
1995.13 Further change is necessary, however, particularly with respect
to the division of labor between the state's two appellate courts.
Despite the inherent danger in making any call for reform, 4 this
article suggests two methods for restructuring the present system.
Both would allow the supreme court to focus on law development
while at the same time reducing the likelihood of "double appeals,"
Laurence, The Supreme Court and the Defaulting Garnishee: An Essay on Metal
Processing, Inc. v. Plastic & Reconstructive Associates, Ltd. and a Few of Its
Predecessors, 40 ARK. L. Rv. 1 (1986), and John J. Watkins, Procedural Issues
in an Annexation Case: A Dissenting Opinion to Gay v. City of Springdale, 1986
ARK. L. NOTES 55. This article briefly considers a more recent example in note
88, infra. This problem is not unique to the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Robert
Laurence, Bona Fide Purchaser Analysis, Beverage Products Corporation v. Ro-
binson, and the Case against Very Short Opinions, 1990 ARK. L. NOTES 85 (discussing
an opinion of the court of appeals).
11. There is "an inevitable conflict" between avoiding delay and producing
quality decisions. "The ideal is to eliminate delay while maintaining excellence, an
end more easily stated than achieved, but one that must be a court's constant
goal." ROBERT A. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS
9 (1976).
12. DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 26 (1994).
13. Act of Apr. 13, 1993, No. 1085, § 1, 1993 Ark. Acts 3275, 3276 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-101(c) (Michie 1994)).
14. As an English lord observed in the 1840s: "Reform, Sir, reform! I've heard
enough about reform. Things are bad enough as they are." Roger C. Cramton,
The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 335 (1982).
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those in which a given case is considered on the merits by both
appellate courts. These proposals are set forth below, following a
review of some historical and statistical matters, the role of appellate
courts, and various models of case allocation.
I. BACKGROUND
As early as 1965, there were indications that the supreme court's
workload was to the point that "some relief may soon be neces-
sary."" That was the conclusion of the Arkansas Judiciary Com-
mission, an advisory body created by the General Assembly in 1963
to make a comprehensive study of the state's judicial system.1
6
However, the Commission did not believe that an intermediate ap-
pellate court should be established; rather, it recommended that the
supreme court "sit in divisions in all except questions of constitutional
law and capital cases, or except when there is a dissent in a divi-
sion.'17
The supreme court did not take this step immediately, despite
a steadily growing caseload that was consistent with the national
trend.'" From 1964 to 1974, for example, the number of decided
cases jumped from 274 to 440, an increase of 60.6 percent.' 9 Creation
of an intermediate appellate court was proposed in 1968,20 and
authorization for such a body was included in the judicial article
15. ARKANSAS JUDICIARY COMM'N REPORT TO 1965 GENERAL ASSEMBLY 14 (1965).
16. See Act of Feb. 28, 1963, No. 116, 1963 Ark. Acts 321. John A. Fogleman,
who later served with distinction on the supreme court, chaired the commission.
17. REPORT TO 1965 GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 15, at 14. A statute giving
the supreme court authority to sit in three-judge panels has been on the books
since 1925. See Act of Mar. 21, 1925, No. 205, § 2, 1925 Ark. Acts 597, 597-98
(codified at APK. CODE ANN. § !6-1!-!04 (Michie 1994)).
18. See Thomas B. Marvell, Is There an Appeal from the Caseload Deluge?,
JUDGES' J., Summer 1985, at 34, 35 (noting that appellate caseloads "began to
skyrocket" in the mid-1960s). As another commentator has observed, "[tihe growth
in the caseloads of appellate courts, both federal and state, since 1960 almost
defies comprehension." ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND
AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 155 (1990).
19. See JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1974); JUDICIAL
DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1964-65).
20. The state's judicial department, for example, recommended that "serious
consideration and study be given to appropriate methods, including the establishment
of an intermediate appellate court, . . . to avoid the delays experienced by other
states at the appellate level." The department also noted that Colorado, a state
with a seven-member supreme court and a comparable workload, was considering
a six-judge intermediate appellate court. JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 12-13 (1968).
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of the ill-fated 1970 constitution that was rejected by the voters. 2'
In 1974, the supreme court responded to the problem by pro-
viding for unpublished opinions in cases without significant prece-
dential value.2 Two years later, the court adopted the commission's
recommendation and began sitting in divisions, rather than en banc,
on most appeals.
23
These measures, however, proved to be of the stopgap variety.
In 1977, the supreme court disposed of 576 appeals, 24 a 60.9 percent
increase from the 1974 total. On average, each justice produced 70
signed majority opinions;25 with concurring opinions, dissents, and
per curiam opinions included, the average was 81 per judge. 26 Justice
John A. Fogleman alone wrote 100 signed opinions, or about two
per week. 27 Concluding that the court could not cope with an in-
creased caseload by sitting in divisions, he believed that creation of
an intermediate appellate court was "desirable. '" 28 Chief Justice Car-
21. The proposed constitution was the product of a constitutional convention
held in 1969-70. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Constitutional Revision in Arkansas,
24 ARK. L. REV. 155 (1970). Section 5 of Article V, the judicial article, provided:
A court of appeals is established, which shall remain inoperative until
activated by rule of the supreme court and funds therefor are appropriated
by the General Assembly.
The court of appeals shall consist of such divisions and have such
appellate jurisdiction as the supreme court shall by rule determine.
Judges of the court of appeals shall have the same qualifications as
justices of the supreme court and shall be elected by majority vote on a
non-partisan basis at statewide general elections for terms of six years.
For a review of the judicial article, see Ronald L. Boyer, A New Judicial System
for Arkansas, 24 ARK. L. REv. 221 (1970).
22. See George Rose Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions: One Court's
Experience, 32 ARK. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (1978). There was considerable dissatisfaction
among Arkansas lawyers with this practice. See David Newbern & Douglas L.
Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REV. 37,
39-42 (1978).
23. See In re Supreme Court Procedure for Sitting in Divisions, 260 Ark. 380
(1976). The court had previously considered sitting in divisions but had been unable
to reach agreement on the matter because some justices preferred "to attempt to
obtain a constitutional amendment authorizing an intermediate appellate court."
Chief Justice Carleton Harris, Speech to Pulaski County Bar Association (1977),
quoted in Don E. Tomlinson, A court of appeals of Arkansas: To Be or Not To
Be?, ARK. LAW., Oct. 1978, at 196, 200; see also Lyle Brown, The Handling of
Supreme Court Cases-Processing, Practice, and Procedure, 22 ARK. L. REV. 679,
684 (1969) (noting that court was "surveying the possibility" of creating divisions).
24. JuDIciAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1977).
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Remarks to the Annual Meeting of the Arkansas Judicial Council, Helena,
Arkansas (Oct. 14, 1970), quoted in C.R. Huie & G. Lawrence Jegley, Is Justice
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leton Harris sounded the same theme: "[I]t will be difficult for the
Court to keep pace with its skyrocketing workload in the years to
come unless help in the form of an intermediate appellate court
... is forthcoming.
'29
The General Assembly responded in 1978 by placing before the
voters a proposed constitutional amendment permitting the creation
of such a court. The measure was approved in the November general
election and became Amendment 58 to the Arkansas Constitution:
The General Assembly is hereby empowered to create and
establish a court of appeals and divisions thereof. The court of
appeals shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the supreme court
shall by rule determine, and shall be subject to the general
superintending control of the supreme court. Judges of the court
of appeals shall have the same qualifications as justices of the
supreme court and shall be selected in the manner provided by
law.
Enabling legislation enacted in the next session of the General As-
sembly established a six-member appellate court, effective July 1,
1979.30
Those who supported creation of the court of appeals were
concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with reducing the supreme
court's workload while avoiding a two-step appellate system in which
cases were routinely reviewed by both courts.31 In defining the new
court's jurisdiction,3 2 the supreme court adopted the same philosophy.
As the Court explained in Moose v. Gregory:33
Delayed? A Report from the Court Administrator, 1 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
51, 61 n.l1 (1978). As the supreme court observed several years later, its use of
divisions to cope with the caseload crunch was "met with various degrees of
dissatisfaction." In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n Comm., 303 Ark. 752, 753, 798 S.W.2d
923, 924 (1990).
29. Transmittal letter to Governor David Pryor and the Seventy-first General
Assembly, JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT (1976).
30. Act of Feb. 23, 1979, No. 208, 1979 Ark. Acts 467 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-12-101 to -114 (Michie 1994)). For background regarding creation of
the court of appeals, see C.R. Huie, Juris Dictum, ARK. LAW., July 1979, at 106;
Report on Proposed Amendment No. 58, ARK. LAW., Oct. 1978, at 160; Tomlinson,
supra note 23. With respect to the enabling legislation, see Christopher J. Heller,
Survey, Legislation, 3 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 309, 311-13 (1980).
31. See Report on Proposed Amendment No. 58, supra note 30, at 161 (arguing
that supreme court was at "breaking point" in terms of caseload and emphasizing
that court of appeals would not be "just another step" in securing review by
supreme court but will have "final jurisdiction in some types of cases").
32. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a). See Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 307 Ark. 171, 818 S.W.2d 935 (1991); Moose v. Gregory,
267 Ark. 86, 590 S.W.2d 662 (1979).
33. 267 Ark. 86, 590 S.W.2d 662 (1979).
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Amendment 58 vested in the supreme court the power to determine
the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, so that the total caseload
might be apportioned between the two appellate courts. Ideally,
the supreme court and the court of appeals will each have its
own field of primary jurisdiction. Ideally, each court will in effect
be a court of last resort, with its decisions having a desirable
finality. Ideally, it will be immaterial to the litigant whether his
particular case goes to one court or to the other. Our goal is
to provide each litigant with the opportunity for one appeal only,
not two.
3 4
Under the present jurisdictional scheme adopted by the supreme
court pursuant to Amendment 58,15 cases falling into one of seventeen
categories are assigned to the supreme court in the first instance,
with all others left to the court of appeals.3 6 This division of labor
initially reduced the supreme court's workload, but the number of
cases disposed of on appeal each year by that court has risen steadily
over the past five years and is now approaching the 1978 level.
During that calendar year, the last full reporting period before the
legislature established the court of appeals, the supreme court ter-
minated 585 appeals, an all-time high." In 1980, total terminations
began to drop, reaching a low of 404 in 1985-86.18 Over the last
three fiscal years, however, the court has averaged 512 terminations
annually,3 9 with the 1991-92 total of 521 representing the high-water
mark since creation of the intermediate court. The number of appeals
filed each year reflects a similar pattern; as noted previously, the
supreme court's total for 1992-93 is virtually identical to that of
1978: 514 vs. 516. 40
34. Id. at 89, 590 S.W.2d at 664; see also Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v.
Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 307 Ark. 171, 174, 818 S.W.2d 935, 937 (1991)
("[W]e would not overlook the intent of Amendment 58 and our duty as an
appellate court to see that any decision was fairly and completely reviewed once").
35. ARK. Sup. CT. R. 1-2(a). This assignment of cases is "intended to achieve
an equalization of appellate workload." ARK. Sup. CT. R. 1-2(g).
36. ARK. Sup. CT. R. 1-2(a).
37. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1978), supra note 6, at 1, 6. Technically,
the supreme court disposed of more appeals (657) in 1979. However, that total
includes 173 cases transferred to the court of appeals, which began work on July
1 of that year. If the transferred cases are excluded, the supreme court terminated
484 appeals. See JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1979).
38. JUDICIAL DEP'T OF ARKANSAS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY OF AR-
KANSAS 47 (1985-86).
39. There were 508 terminations in 1990-91, 521 in 1991-92, and 506 in 1992-
93. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ARKANSAS JUDICIARY,
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 1 (1990-91); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ARKANSAS JUDICIARY, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 1 (1991-92); ANNUAL
REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6, at 1.
40. See supra note 6. In 1985-86, when the court terminated 404 appeals, filings
totaled 411. See ANNUAL REPORT (1985-86), supra note 38, at 47.
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The number of majority opinions produced annually also offers
insight into the supreme court's workload. At first blush, it appears
that the number of opinions has declined substantially. In 1978, the
court completed 539 signed majority opinions (77.0 per judge),
compared to an average of 380 over the three most recent fiscal
years for which data is available (54.3 per judge). 4' However, these
statistics are somewhat misleading. Of the 539 opinions prepared in
1978, 328 were deemed significant enough to warrant publication,
while 211 were not published. 42 Typically, unpublished opinions are
shorter and less detailed than the published opinions;43 indeed, one
reason that the supreme court adopted the practice of publishing
only selected opinions was to "reduc[e] the time which must be
devoted to opinion writing." 44 Justice George Rose Smith explained:
It cannot be doubted that selective publication does lighten the
task of opinion writing. [M]uch of the difficulty [in opinion
writing] disappears when an appellate judge sits down to write
an opinion not meant for publication. Here he writes almost
41. ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1990-91), supra note 39, at 2
(384 opinions); ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1991-92), supra note
39, at 2 (388 opinions); ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra
note 6, at 2 (368 opinions); FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1978), supra note 6,
at 10. The figures in the text do not include per curiam opinions in decided cases.
The following table, derived from the sources cited above, provides a more complete
picture:
Year Signed Ops. Per Curiams Total Per-Judge Avg.
1978 539 16 555 79.2
1990-91 384 63 447 63.9
1991-92 388 56 444 63.4
1992-93 368 75 443 63.3
3-yr. average 380 65 445 63.5
42. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1978), supra note 6, at 10. Under supreme
court rules then in effect, an opinion would not be published unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule of law or alters, modifies, or
clarifies an existing rule; or
b. The opinion involves a legal or factual issue of continuing public
interest; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves a real or apparent conflict of authority; or
e. The opinion will serve as a useful reference, such as one reviewing
case law or legislative history.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 21, reprinted in Smith, supra note 22, at 36. For the present
provisions, which are also applicable to the court of appeals, see ARK. SUP. CT.
R. 5-2(c), (d).
43. Of course, some of the 211 opinions that were not published in 1978 may
have treated important issues in something more than a cursory fashion. See Newbern
& Wilson, supra note 22, at 48-56 (reviewing unpublished opinions from 1974-77
and concluding that some went into considerable detail in addressing significant
questions).
44. Smith, supra note 22, at 29.
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entirely for the benefit of the lawyers, the litigants, and, at times,
the trial judge. The opinion need not narrate the procedural
history of the case nor its facts. The writer might begin his
opinion with such an abrupt statement as this: "This case, for
two significant reasons, is not governed by our decision in Doe
v. Roe, 280 Ark. 216." Basically, the judge is merely explaining
to a very limited audience why the case is being decided as it
is. 4
5
Thus, the difference in the number of 1978 opinions and those
written during the three-year period from 1990-91 through 1992-93
does not necessarily reflect a great disparity in the court's workload.
In any event, relying exclusively on the number of signed majority
opinions underestimates that workload. This approach does not take
into account per curiam opinions in decided cases, concurring and
dissenting opinions, orders disposing of motions and petitions, 46 time
spent in conference, and the handling of various administrative
responsibilities.4 7 Moreover, the supreme court, in carrying out its
constitutional duty to oversee the state's judicial system, must deal
with such matters as admission to the bar, attorney discipline, and
45. Smith, supra note 22, at 29. In light of Justice Smith's comments, consider
the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision in Denny v. Radar Indus., Inc., 184
N.W.2d 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970). The entire opinion in that case is as follows:
J.H. GILLIS, Judge.
The appellant has attempted to distinguish the factual situation in this
case from that in Renfroe v. Higgins Rack Coating and Manufacturing
Co., Inc. (1969), 17 Mich. App. 259, 169 N.W.2d 326. He didn't. We
couldn't.
Affirmed. Costs to appellee.
46. In years past, the court's annual statistics included the number of petitions
and motions (excluding motions for extension of time) that required the justices'
attention. In 1978, for example, the court passed on 203 petitions and 282 motions,
a total of 485. By adding this figure to the number of appeals terminated (585),
one could determine the court's "dispositions" for the year, in this case 1,070.
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1978), supra note 6, at 6-8. Over the past several
years, petition statistics have been reported, but those concerning motions have
not. This gap makes it impossible to compare total dispositions in 1978 with those
in more recent years. In 1991-92, for example, the court terminated 521 appeals
and ruled on 309 petitions, a total of 830. ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT
(1991-92), supra note 39, at 1. If the court also handled 240 motions during that
period, its overall dispositions would have reached 1,070, the same level as in 1978.
Although the Administrative Office of the Courts could not provide information
as to motions, the number could easily be as high as 240 per year. In 1983-84,
the last year for which such information is available, the court terminated 304
motions, as well as 448 appeals and 252 petitions - a total of 1,004 dispositions.
JUDICIAL DEP'T oF ARKANSAS, ANNUAL REPORT 18-20 (1983-84).
47. See generally Brown, supra note 9 (describing the court's work and internal
operating procedures).
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the rules of civil and criminal procedure.4 Little of this work is
reflected in the annual statistics.
Even if one focuses solely on the number of majority opinions
as an indicator of an appellate court's workload, the supreme court
is shouldering a heavy burden. In Kansas, a nearby state with
approximately the same population as Arkansas, the number of
opinions per judge on the supreme court is 28.6, 49 about half the
Arkansas average of 54.3. In Louisiana and Missouri, the averages
are even lower: 13.0 and 16.0, respectively. 0 Excluding Arkansas,
the state in this region with the highest average is Tennessee with
42.2 opinions per judge." Still, that figure represents only about
three-fourths of the Arkansas Supreme Court's output, which was
approximately the same in 1992-93 as in 1968,52 when proposals for
establishing an intermediate appellate court began to appear. 3 More-
over, the combined average per judge of Arkansas's two appellate
courts is now higher than the supreme court's average in 1978, the
year before the court of appeals came into existence.1
4
48. See ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (supreme court has "general superintending
control over all inferior courts of law and equity"); ARK. CONST. amend. XXVIII
(supreme court "shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the professional
conduct of attorneys at law").
49. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7,
dt 94 (seven judges, 200 dispositions by signed opinion). States with similar averages
include Colorado (30.8) and Illinois (25.1). STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7, at 94. Actually, most averages taken from
data in this report are inflated, for they are based on a court's "total dispositions
by signed opinion," not simply majority opinions. For example, the Kansas dis-
positions include signed opinions, per curiam opinions, and some memoranda and
orders. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7,
at 94.
50. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7,
at 95. These averages are not unusual for states with a court of last resort and
at least one intermediate appellate court, as the following figures indicate: California
(12.7), New Jersey (11.1), Oregon (16.6), and Wisconsin (12.4). STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7, at 94-96.
51. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7,
at 97. Because three states in the region have different appellate structures, direct
comparisons with Arkansas are more difficult. In Mississippi, which has no in-
termediate appellate court, the average is 42.8. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 96. Oklahoma and Texas both have separate
courts of last resort for civil and criminal cases. Data for Oklahoma was not
available, but the Texas Supreme Court and Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had
averages of 14.1 and 22.9, respectively, and a combined average of 18.5. STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7, at 97.
52. The average in 1992-93 was 52.6, compared to 53.4 in 1968. See ANNUAL
REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6, at 2; FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT (1968), supra note 20, at 18.
53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54. In 1978, the supreme court issued 539 signed majority opinions, an average
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A judge serving on a court of last resort cannot produce opinions
at the rate of more than one per week and devote sufficient time
and energy to the judicial process. Appellate judges must give the
legal issues careful study, refine their thinking in the course of
drafting opinions and interacting with law clerks and colleagues,
and produce opinions that will not only win majority approval but
also illuminate the issues for lower courts and practicing lawyers."
Judging requires much more than the mechanical application of
precedent; judges are not assembly line workers,5 6 and courts are
not simply "processing institutions." ' 57 As H.L. Mencken once wrote,
judges should not "perform their duties in the manner of checkers
at a race-track or pump-men at a filling station.
'5 8
II. THE ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS
There is little disagreement as to whether appellate review is
essential in the administration of justice. Although such review is
not required as a matter of due process,5 9 litigants in this country
have traditionally been provided with one appeal as a matter of
of 77.0 per judge. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1978), supra note 6, at 10. In
1992-93, the supreme court produced 368 such opinions and the court of appeals
652, a combined average of 78.5 per judge. ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUP-
PLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6, at 2, 6.
55. Writing good opinions is difficult and time-consuming. As Professor Cooper
has noted:
[T]he outstanding legal writers have preferred to revise, and revise, and
then revise again. Cardozo found that phrases, like diamonds, required
laborious polishing to achieve a brilliant luster. Brandeis often rewrote an
opinion a dozen times. Once, Justice Frankfurter tells us, there were fifty-
three revisions.
FRANK E. COOPER, WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE 33 (1963); see also Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965, 992
(1993) (noting that the conditions under which judges work "make good opinion
writing difficult" and that "[tlime for thoughtful consideration and reconsideration
is hard to come by").
56. Judges have employed the mass production metaphor to describe one con-
sequence of increasing caseloads. See, e.g., WARREN BURGER, YEAR END REPORT
OF THE JUDICIARY 2 (1981) (noting that heavy caseloads force the courts "towards
an assembly line model"); James A. Gazell, Chief Justice Rose Bird: A Two-Year
Performance Review, 1980 DET. C.L. REv. 419 (quoting the former California
chief justice's statement that "[ain assembly line concept has no place in a judiciary
whose members take pride in the quality and craft of their work"); see also J.
Woodford Howard, Jr., Are Heavy Caseloads Changing the Nature of Appellate
Justice?, 66 JUDICATURE 57, 58 (1982) (expressing concern about "assembly line
justice" caused by increasing appellate caseloads).
57. Robert Bork, Dealing with Overloads in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
233 (1976).
58. H.L. Mencken, Book Review, AM. MERCURY, July 1933, at 381.
59. E.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); National Union of Marine
Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954).
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right.60 Chief Judge John Parker of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the rationale for this system
as follows:
The judicial function in its essence is the application of the rules
and standards of organized society to the settlement of contro-
versies, and for there to be any proper administration of justice
these rules and standards must be applied, not only impartially,
but also objectively and uniformly throughout the territory of
the state. This requires that decisions of trial courts be subjected
to review by a panel of judges who are removed from the heat
engendered by the trial and are consequently in a position to
take a more objective view of the questions there raised to
maintain uniformity of decision throughout the territory.61
It is also generally agreed that appellate courts have two basic
functions: "to review individual cases to assure that substantial justice
has been rendered" and "to develop the law for general application
in the legal system." '62 With respect to the former, usually referred
to as "error correction," appellate courts "serve as the instrument
of accountability for those who make the basic decisions in trial
courts and administrative agencies." ' 63 As for the latter, often called
"law development," appellate courts "keep the law in proper order"
64
by providing "a means for the ongoing . . . evolution of the law
in the common-law tradition.
'65
60. See ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING
TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10(a), at 13 (1977) (stating that with minor exceptions,
"[a] party to a proceeding heard on the record in a trial court should be entitled
to an appeal of right from a final judgment"); ROBERT STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1981) (stating that the "accepted model for fair appellate
procedure" has included the right to one appeal). The appellate tradition is a
venerable one that "dates back some 4000 to 6000 years to several highly developed
civilizations in that fecund area of the world we call the Near East." FRANK M.
COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 17 (1980).
61. John J. Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1950).
62. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 4 (commentary
to § 3.00); see also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 14-16 (1994);
PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976); LEFLAR, supra note
11, at 3-5 (1976); MARTINEAU, supra note 18, at 28-30; MEADOR & BERNSTEIN,
supra note 12, at 3-4.
63. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 62, at 2.
64. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 4.
65. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 4. This function is also described
as "institutional review" or "lawmaking." See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra
note 62, at 2; LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 4. However, the term used in the text
seems preferable. "Institutional review" is not in itself particularly descriptive, and
"lawmaking" carries a negative connotation among those who, like George Bush,
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While appellate review serves other purposes as well,66 these
dual functions lie at the core of the process. In jurisdictions without
an intermediate appellate court, both are necessarily performed by
the supreme court. 67 When an intermediate appellate body exists,
however, it has primary responsibility for error correction, while
law development is left largely to the supreme court. 6 This division
of labor is recognized in the American Bar Association's Standards
Relating to Appellate Courts.69
Of course, the line between the error correction and law de-
velopment functions is not a bright one. A state court of last resort
clearly has an obligation, in hearing a case accepted under its
discretionary jurisdiction, to correct a trial court error. Similarly,
cling to the naive notion that courts do not "make law." The lawmaking function
has been with us for some time; as Professor Kurland has observed, it "is the
genius of the common law system that we inherited from our English forbears."
Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a
Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974).
66. As noted previously, appellate review helps ensure uniformity and, therefore,
promotes the evenhanded treatment of litigants within the system. Kurland, supra
note 65, at 618. Moreover, such review "heighten[s] the legitimacy and acceptability
of judicial decisions." MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 4. Without this
review, losing litigants and the general public may not consider a trial judge's
ruling a legitimate resolution of the controversy. Similarly, appellate courts "provide
a means for the institutional sharing of judicial responsibility for decisions." MEADOR
& BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5. Appellate courts also "provide executive direction
and assistance to the trial courts." Shirley M. Hufstedler, Constitutional Revision
and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. REV. 577, 587 (1969).
67. Eleven states and the District of Columbia do not have intermediate appellate
courts. Those states are: Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire,
Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
North Dakota has a "temporary court of appeals" that functions under authority
delegated by the supreme court. Seldom used, it has no permanent membership
and is staffed by trial court judges and retired judges. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN,
supra note 12, at 145; see also STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT
1992, supra note 7, at 172-223 (describing key features of each state's court
organization).
68. See MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 26 (stating that "the supreme
court is concerned primarily with the development of the law, while the intermediate
court is concerned primarily with the application of existing law"); James D.
Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 459,
462 (1975) (intermediate appellate courts "relieve the burden" on the court of last
resort, which is then able to focus on "the development of the law as a whole");
Richard H. Mills, The Caseload Explosion: The Appellate Response, 16 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1982) (stating that the intermediate appellate court "is assigned
the function of correcting mistakes," while the court of last resort has as its
primary function "the obligation of law development, of resolving conflicts among
lower courts, of teaching the other courts and lawyers and [the] public about the
law").
69. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 4 (commentary
to § 3.00).
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an intermediate appellate court will from time to time help develop
the law. For example, the court might be confronted with an issue
of first impression or a question or fact situation that does not fall
squarely within existing precedent. 70 Proportionately, though, the
intermediate appellate court will handle more error-correction appeals
and face fewer new issues than the supreme court, 7' and its principal
task is "to apply the existing law of the jurisdiction as best it can
interpret it, not to make new law." '
72
Accordingly, an intermediate appellate court should not be so
brazen as to reject controlling supreme court precedent or seek to
undercut a prior decision by "distinguishing it away." 73 As Dr.
Robert A. Leflar has pointed out, however, an intermediate appellate
court may quite properly "stimulate revision of the law by calling
attention to the need for change, either legislative or judicial, when
it cannot itself make changes. ' 74 While adhering to precedent, the
court might suggest that a particular rule is unfair, difficult to apply,
70. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Arkansas Dev. Fin. Auth., 44 Ark. App. 143,
870 S.W.2d 400 (1994) (holding that the agreement to waive statute of limitations
for all time, made at the inception of the contract, is void because it violates
public policy); Staab v. Hurst, 44 Ark. App. 128, 868 S.W.2d 517 (1994) (determining
standard to be applied by trial court in deciding when custodial parent may relocate
outside the state).
71. Benjamin Kaplan, Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Have a Lawmaking
Function?, 70 MASS. L. REV. 10, 12 (1985). Justice Cardozo divided cases into
three categories: (1) cases in which the law and its application are plain; (2) cases
in which the rule of law is certain and its application alone is doubtful; and (3)
cases in which both the rule of law and the application are doubtful. He estimated
that at least 90 percent of the cases decided by appellate courts fall into the first
two categories. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924); see
also Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE
L.J. 218, 222 (1961) (agreeing with Cardozo's estimate); Harry T. Edwards, The
Judiciai Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionnmaking., 1991 Wis.
L. REv. 837, 856-57 (estimating that about 50 percent of cases are easy, 35-45
percent "hard" in the sense that each party is able to advance at least one plausible
legal argument in its favor, and the remaining 5-15 percent "very hard").
72. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 27.
73. These techniques have been labeled "bold challenge" and "quiet usurpation,"
respectively. Hopkins, supra note 68, at 466. Judge Hopkins considered both
inappropriate, arguing that the intermediate appellate court should avoid "infringing
upon the prerogative of the highest court to make changes in the law." Id. at
467; see also Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973) ("To allow a
District Court of Appeal to overrule controlling precedent of this Court would be
to create chaos and uncertainty in the judicial forum, particularly at the trial
level."); First Nat'l Bank v. Lockeby, No. CA 88-180, 1988 WL 122816, at *2
(Ark. Ct. App. 1988) ("IT]his Court is bound by our supreme court's decision
and obviously cannot overrule them.").
74, LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 64.
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or at odds with the modern trend." For example, in Coleman v.
State6 the Arkansas Court of Appeals expressed its "misgivings"
about a decision of the supreme court but did its best to apply the
holding. 7 In some jurisdictions, including Arkansas, an intermediate
appellate court can certify cases of legal significance or public im-
portance to the court of last resort.
78
Even though Arkansas has had an intermediate appellate court
for fifteen years, the division of functions described above has never
been achieved. Indeed, it was not intended. As discussed previously,
those who favored creation of the court of appeals believed that it
should generally have the last word in the cases within its jurisdiction,
with further review by the supreme court limited to exceptional
circumstances. 79 This view, which is reflected in the present juris-
dictional arrangement, has resulted in a large number of cases being
appealed directly to the supreme court as a matter of right. Because
most of these cases are insignificant in terms of law development,
the court's only role is correction of error. On the other side of
the coin, the court of appeals has the final say in a great many
cases and thus plays a major role in development of the law. While
the supreme court may in its discretion review such cases,80 it is
75. Such an effort to reshape the law might take the form of a "polite nudge"
or an "outright plea for change." Hopkins, supra note 68, at 465.
76. 12 Ark. App. 214, 671 S.W.2d 221 (1984).
77. Id. at 218, 671 S.W.2d at 223; see also High v. Southland Racing Corp.,
No. CA 92-794, 1993 WL 366977, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) ("Although we
concede that we do not fully understand the basis for the supreme court's decision,
we are bound by it.").
78. See LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 76-77. At present, the Arkansas Court of
Appeals may certify a case to the supreme court upon finding that the case either
falls outside the jurisdiction of the court of appeals or "involves an issue of
significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance." The supreme
court "may accept for its docket cases so certified or may remand any of them
to the court of appeals for decision." ARK. SuP. CT. R. 1-2(d). For other states
that provide for some type of predecisional certification, see infra note 138.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
80. The supreme court's rule governing petitions for review of decisions by the
court of appeals provides as follows:
No appeal as of right shall lie from the court of appeals to the supreme
court. A petition for review may be granted by the supreme court for
review of a decision of the court of appeals only if the supreme court
determines that the case (1) should have come to the supreme court
originally under Section (a) of this Rule, (2) should have been certified
to the supreme court under Section (d)(2) of this Rule, or (3) was decided
in the court of appeals by a tie vote.
ARK. Sup. CT. R. 1-2(f) (emphasis added). The fact that a case falls within one
of these categories means only that the supreme court may grant review, not that
it is required to do so. See, e.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 267 Ark. 112, 113, 589
S.W.2d 29, 30 (1979) (holding that the supreme court "doles] not automatically
grant . . . review" in cases where the court of appeals is evenly divided).
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not likely to do so with any degree of regularity because of its
mandatory jurisdiction. Facing a docket crowded with direct appeals,
the supreme court has precious little time to consider decisions of
the court of appeals. In its 1993-94 term, for example, the supreme
court decided with full opinion only five cases on petition for review
from the court of appeals.8 During the same period, the supreme
court accepted only eight cases via certification.1
2
Apart from the blurring of appellate functions, the present
method of allocating cases on the basis of their subject matter can
lead to doctrinal confusion. Consider the following example from
the choice-of-law area. Under Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(16), "[c]ases
presenting a question about the law of torts" are appealed directly
to the supreme court. In 1987, the court held that choice-of-law
questions in tort cases are to be governed by Dr. Leflar's famous
"choice-influencing considerations. s" 83 This decision came ten years
81. Those five cases are: Second Injury Trust Fund v. White Constr., 317 Ark.
26, 875 S.W.2d 834 (1994); Second Injury Trust Fund v. POM, Inc., 316 Ark.
796, 875 S.W.2d 832 (1994); Maloy v. Stuttgart Memorial Hosp., 316 Ark. 447,
872 S.W.2d 401 (1994) (deciding case in which court of appeals was evenly divided);
Grimes v. North Am. Foundry, 316 Ark. 395, 872 S.W.2d 59 (1994) (deciding case
in which court of appeals was evenly divided); Hawkins v. City of Prairie Grove,
316 Ark. 150, 871 S.W.2d 357 (1994) (deciding case that should have been heard
by supreme court in the first instance, since it involved question of statutory
interpretation). The supreme court also handed down two per curiam opinions in
cases from the court of appeals: Porter v. State, 315 Ark. 160, 865 S.W.2d 300
(1993) (allowing criminal defendant to file belated petition for review of court of
appeals' decision affirming his conviction); Mangiapane v. State, 314 Ark. 350,
862 S.W.2d 258 (1993) (reversing dismissal of appeal as untimely and remanding
to court of appeals for decision on merits).
Technically speaking, the supreme court is reviewing the judgment of the trial
court, not the decision of the court of appeals. That is, the supreme court "review[s]
the case as though it had been originally filed in this court." Maloy v. Stuttgart
Memorial Hosp., 316 Ark. "', AA9, 87 S ,2d 401 (1994) However there are
cases suggesting the contrary. E.g., Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 Ark. 103,
107, 842 S.W.2d 7, 10 (1992) ("We therefore affirm the court of appeals."). Of
course, the supreme court need not ignore the opinion issued by the court of
appeals. If that opinion is particularly persuasive or includes a theory not advanced
by the parties, then the supreme court is certainly free to adopt it.
82. Those cases are: Martin v. Martin, 316 Ark. 765, 875 S.W.2d 819 (1994);
Brown v. State, 316 Ark. 724, 875 S.W.2d 828 (1994); Alexander v. Town &
Country Foods, 316 Ark. 446, 872 S.W.2d 390 (1994); Gidron v. State, 316 Ark.
352, 872 S.W.2d 64 (1994); Department of Human Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119,
871 S.W.2d 352 (1994); Smith v. State, 316 Ark. 32, 870 S.W.2d 716 (1994) (appeal
dismissed); Teague v. Walnut Ridge Sch., 315 Ark. 424, 868 S.W.2d 56 (1993);
Norwood v. Robinson, 315 Ark. 255, 866 S.W.2d 398 (1993).
83. Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 344, 346, 730 S.W.2d
217, 218-19 (1987); see generally Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations
in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law:
More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
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after the court had formally abandoned the old lex loci delicti rule
without clearly identifying the modern choice-of-law method that
would replace it.4
Because Rule 1-2(a) does not mention cases involving the law
of contracts, those are assigned to the court of appeals. In a 1986
decision, a three-judge panel of that court set forth the general
choice-of-law rule for contracts as follows: "[Tihe nature, validity
and interpretation of contracts are to be governed by the law of
the place where they are made.""5 The court took this language
from a supreme court case decided in 1913,86 a time when the courts
were wedded to a mechanical choice-of-law approach. This same
thinking had, of course, spawned the lex loci delicti rule that the
supreme court jettisoned in 1977. In light of what it perceived to
be the settled rule in contracts cases, however, the court of appeals
apparently decided that it was not free to break new ground in
deciding the issues before it.87
84. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977)
(apparently using a combination of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS and
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations); see also Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark. 326,
332, 565 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 (1978) (citing Wallis for proposition that Arkansas
courts "are free to apply the rule based on the 'most significant relationship' as
affected by the . . . choice-influencing considerations"). A decade earlier, the court
had specifically declined an invitation to discard the lex loci delicti rule. McGinty
v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 536-38, 408 S.W.2d 891, 893-94 (1966).
85. Hammons v. Prudential Ins. Co., 19 Ark. App. 112, 114, 717 S.W.2d 819,
820 (1986); accord White v. Toney, 37 Ark. App. 36, 40, 823 S.W.2d 921, 924
(1992). At one time, this was the "orthodox statement" of the rule. Robert A.
Leflar, Conflict of Laws-Arkansas, 10 U. ARK. LAW SCH. BULL. 45, 56 (1942).
86. Lawler v. Lawler, 107 Ark. 70, 153 S.W. 1113 (1913).
87. The Arkansas choice-of-law rule for contracts cases was not as settled as
the court of appeals apparently thought. As Dr. Leflar pointed out more than 50
years ago, Arkansas cases could be found in support of three different approaches:
the law of the place where the contract is made; the law of the place of performance;
and the intent of the parties, if the place has a substantial connection with the
contract. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, THE ARKANSAS LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 212-16
(1938).
By the 1960s, there were Arkansas decisions "in which an intelligent effort
ha[d] been made to devise a choice-of-law rule that may avoid the three-directional
confusion of the old cases by giving real reasons for the choices made." Robert
A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1969-72, 27 ARK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1973)
[hereinafter Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas]. For this proposition, Dr. Leflar
cited Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963),
in which the supreme court noted the three lines of authority but declined to choose
among them. The court also mentioned but did not employ the "center of gravity"
approach, a close cousin to the "most significant relationship" test. In a 1969
case, however, the court stated flatly that the law of the place of performance
governs. McDearmon v. Gordon & Gremillion, 247 Ark. 318, 324-25, 445 S.W.2d
488, 492 (1969). This case, among others, prompted Dr. Leflar to remark that
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It was not until 1994 that the supreme court responded with
a decision employing a more modern choice-of-law rule for contracts
cases."8 For several years, therefore, the court of appeals as a practical
"[tlhe Arkansas law governing choice of law in contracts cases appears less settled
now than it did a few years ago." Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, supra, at
12.
In a subsequent usury case, the supreme court seemed to adopt, without discussion
or elaboration, a choice-of-law test that looked to the state in which the "principal
significant contacts" occurred. Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc.,
264 Ark. 851, 855, 576 S.W.2d 181, 184 (1979). In that decision, the Court also
failed to recognize the relevance of the choice-of-law provision set out in Section
1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-105 (Michie
Supp. 1993). See generally Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws Under the U.C.C.,
35 ARK. L. REV. 87 (1981); Note, 34 ARK. L. REV. 297 (1980) (criticizing the
Standard Leasing case).
88. Ducharme v. Ducharme, 316 Ark. 482, 485, 872 S.W.2d 392, 394 (1994)
(adopting "most significant relationship" test of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971)). In this decision, the court relied on two earlier
usury cases, neither of which expressly made reference to the Restatement approach.
See Standard Leasing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc., 264 Ark. 851, 855, 576
S.W.2d 181, 184 (1979) (determining that "principal significant contacts" occurred
in Arkansas); Yarbrough v. Prentice Lee Tractor Co., 252 Ark. 349, 353, 479
S.W.2d 549, 552 (1972) (although there was nothing to "establish one state's contacts
as being more significant than the other," Louisiana did not lack "substantial
connection" to the transaction).
In Ducharme the court also pointed to Dr. Leflar's treatise to support its
adoption of the "most significant relationship" test. Ducharme, 316 Ark. at 485,
872 S.W.2d at 394 (citing ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 149 (4th ed. 1986)). In that section of the treatise, however, Dr. Leflar and his
co-authors simply describe the test and note that "a majority of American courts"
probably follow it. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 149,
at 425 (4th ed. 1986). The lengthy footnote accompanying this statement lists several
cases, none from Arkansas. Id. at n.13. The two Arkansas decisions cited in
Ducharme are mentioned in § 152 of the treatise, which deals with usury. Id.
§ 152, at 432 n.6, 433 n.9. As the authors point out, the Restatement uses "a
rule peculiar to usury," namely, "a contract will be sustained if its rate of interest
is permitted by any state to which the contract is substantially related and is not
greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the state whose law would otherwise
govern the contract." Id. at 431 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 203 (1971)).
Even more troubling is the supreme court's failure in Ducharme to explain why
the "most significant relationship" test, rather than the Leflar choice-influencing
considerations used in tort cases, should be controlling. Dr. Leflar anticipated that
his approach, having been adopted in Arkansas for torts cases, would "in due
time" be applied "to contracts and other areas. . . ." Robert A. Leflar, Conflict
of Laws: Arkansas, 1973-77, 32 ARK. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1978). As he subsequently
pointed out, "The American trend is toward applying a unified test, or approach,
to all kinds of choice-of-law problems, rather than having one rule for tort cases,
another (or several others) for contracts, and so on." Robert A. Leflar, Conflict
of Laws: Arkansas, 1978-82, 36 ARc. L. REV. 191, 198 (1982).
It is perhaps worth noting that the court of appeals has used the choice-
influencing considerations outside the tort setting. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Faas, No.
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matter had the last word on a choice-of-law issue, simply because
the case involved a contract rather than a tort. This result, which
is hardly limited to the choice-of-law area, 9 has been succinctly
criticized:
The supreme court ... decides many cases which are very in-
significant to all but the parties involved because they can be
said, for example, to involve a question in the law of torts. The
court of appeals decides many very significant cases by a panel
of three judges because those cases do not fall within an arbitrarily
selected category assigned to the supreme court. 90
In Moose v. Gregory, the supreme court cited the comments
of Dr. Leflar to support its conclusion that the court of appeals
should "be treated as a court of final authority in the particular
area of its own jurisdiction." 91 However, the court failed to take
CVA 90-367, 1991 WL 111010 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (case involving personal
property); Threlkeld v. Worsham, 30 Ark. App. 251, 785 S.W.2d 249 (1990) (Leflar
approach employed in connection with § 1-105(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code);
Orintas v. Meadows, 17 Ark. App. 214, 706 S.W.2d 199 (1986) (workers' com-
pensation case).
89. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Arkansas Dev. Fin. Auth., 44 Ark. App. 143,
870 S.W.2d 400 (1994) (holding that agreement to waive statute of limitations for
all time, made at inception of contract, violates public policy and is therefore
void); Spencer v. Floyd, 30 Ark. App. 230, 785 S.W.2d 60 (1990) (determining
that when beneficiary of life insurance policy intentionally kills insured, proceeds
from policy should be distributed to contingency beneficiary rather than to insured's
estate); Council v. Owens, 28 Ark. App. 49, 770 S.W.2d 193 (1989) (concluding
that income of spendthrift trust in hands of trustee who is without discretion to
withhold income from beneficiaries may be attached to satisfy arrearage in alimony).
The cases cited above all involved issues of first impression in Arkansas. Because
the questions have not been addressed by the supreme court, however, they cannot
be considered as definitively resolved. Of what authoritative weight, then, are
decisions of the court of appeals? This question arises in all jurisdictions with
intermediate appellate courts. See, e.g., Taylor Mattis, Precedential Value of De-
cisions of the Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico, 22 N. MEX. L. REV.
535 (1992); Comment, The Minnesota Court of Appeals: A Court Without Precedent?,
19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 743 (1993).
90. REPORT OF THE APPELLATE COURTS SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 4. As
the report points out, the allocation scheme also invites manipulation. Under Rule
1-2(a)(3), cases involving questions of statutory interpretation are assigned to the
supreme court. "It is a poor advocate who cannot find some sort of statutory
interpretation issue to raise on appeal of virtually any civil case and thus permit
the possibility of shopping for a forum of seven justices as opposed to a panel
of three judges in a case which has little implication for 'law development."'
REPORT OF THE APPELLATE COURTS SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 4.
91. Moose v. Gregory, 267 Ark. 86, 88, 590 S.W.2d 662, 663 (1979). The court
said:
We acknowledge our indebtedness to the wisdom of Dr. Robert A. Leflar,
an outstanding professor of law and a former member of this court. Dr.
1994]
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into account Dr. Leflar's warning about the dangers of allocating
cases on the basis of their subject matter. In his influential book,
Internal Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts, he addressed
this issue as follows:
It is quite proper for matters of major importance, such as
constitutional issues and death-penalty cases, to go directly to
the top court; they should go there eventually in any event. Little
is gained by running them through the intermediate court first,
and both delay and lost effort may ensue. Broader jurisdictional
allocations, however, may miss the whole point of having two
appellate levels. A case involving less than $10,000 may present
basic legal issues that ought to be passed on by the top court,
and one involving more than $10,000 may present no such issues.
An equity case may or may not produce major issues. Similarly,
Public Service Commission and workmen's compensation appeals
vary. It is best not to make little supreme courts out of inter-
mediate courts by making their decisions final in cases that fall
within some arbitrary classification. Nor should the system be
deprived of the economy of appellate trial in intermediate courts
because of a classification that may automatically require the top
court to hear unimportant cases. Any type of case can be po-
tentially important. Apart from a few areas such as constitutional
law in which nearly all issues are important, it is best to let the
intermediate court have jurisdiction over all kinds of appeals,
subject to some discretionary authority that will enable the top
court to take over the final adjudication of those that, for policy
reasons, belong there.
92
Other commentators share this view, 93 which is reflected in the
Leflar repeatedly urged, from the time Amendment 58 was first proposed,
that the new court should not merely add another step to the appellate
process. To the contrary, Dr. Leflar urged that the proposed court of
appeals have its own areas of jurisdiction, with corresponding final au-
thority. It was Dr. Leflar's thought that cases requiring a determination
of public policy or the setting of important precedent should be reserved
for the supreme court, with more routine cases going to the court of
appeals.
Id. at 88, 590 S.W.2d at 663-64.
92. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 70-71.
93. E.g., Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16
AKRON L. REV. 43 (1982). As Mr. Marvell observed in this article, "The division
of jurisdiction between appellate courts ... may be unclear for many appeals,
leading to confusion among the bar and to additional issues that must be decided
by the supreme court." Id. at 90. There are other major drawbacks as well:
The jurisdictional alignments, although typically based on judgments about
the importance of various types of appeals, can only imperfectly route
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ABA's standards for appellate courts.Y
To be sure, the supreme court, not the General Assembly, is
responsible for defining appellate jurisdiction, and the court is free
to modify Rule 1-2 at any time. By initially establishing a six-member
court of appeals, however, the legislature significantly limited the
supreme court's options with respect to the allocation of cases
between the two courts. 95 In adopting Rule 1-2, the supreme court
was simply playing the hand that it was dealt by the General
Assembly.
III. EXPANDING THE COURT OF APPEALS
A larger intermediate appellate court is necessary if the supreme
court is to have discretion over its docket and the concomitant ability
to give adequate attention to its law-development responsibilities. If
the judges remain "chained totally to the caseload," they cannot
maintain "the degree of spacious vision" necessary to play their
proper role in the evolution of the law.9 It has been suggested that,
for law development purposes, a judge cannot reasonably be expected
to produce more than twenty majority opinions annually. 97 In a
typical year, each member of the Arkansas Supreme Court writes
more than twice that many.
the important issues, especially law-making issues, to the court of last
resort. Thus, some appeals with important issues are initially filed in the
intermediate court, requiring double appeals. Another problem is that a
jurisdictional alignment based on a state's appellate caseload in one period
very often leads to an overburdened supreme court several years later. As
caseloads rise, the supreme court must hear more appeals of right, many
of which do not contain important questions and could be decided by the
intermediate court. The supreme court's caseload may continue to increase
drastically and overwhelm the court.
Id. at 92.
94. STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, § 3.10(b), (d),
at 13-14 (with limited exceptions for death penalty appeals and cases of "great
and immediate" public importance, initial appellate review should lie in intermediate
court). As the commentary to this section explains, "Provisions conferring a right
of direct review before the supreme court . .. have invariably resulted in inap-
propriate allocations of the supreme court's resources. . . ." Id. at 16 (commentary
to § 3.10). Such a misallocation occurs "when the high court must decide many
cases without substantial legal issues." Marvell, supra note 93, at 91.
95. The legislature also contributed to this problem by requiring that a case be
submitted to the court of appeals en banc if the three-judge panel to which it was
initially assigned did not reach a unanimous decision. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-
113 (Michie 1994) (effective until July 1, 1995).
96. Thomas R. Karrenberg & Daniel Watkiss, Note, An Intermediate Appellate
Court: Does Utah Need One?, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 107, 124 (1979) (quoting Judge
Shirley lfufstedler, formerly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
97. Robert J. Martineau, The Appellate Process in Civil Cases: A Proposed
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Expansion of the court of appeals, followed by revision of Rule
1-2, will have a dramatic effect on the function of the supreme
court, as the experience in North Carolina indicates. In 1967, when
the state had only one appellate court, the seven-member North
Carolina Supreme Court wrote 473 opinions, an average of 67.5 per
judge. In 1969 and 1970, after an intermediate appellate court was
established and the supreme court's jurisdiction was made almost
wholly discretionary, the annual average was 94 opinions - about
13.5 per judge. 98 A similar average is not unusual in states with
intermediate appellate courts. 99
The drop in caseload did not mean that the judges of the North
Carolina Supreme Court were doing less work; rather, they were
doing different work. As the authors of one study have observed:
[The judges] now had to screen petitions for review, and there
are indications that they began to spend more time and effort
on each case they accepted. The average 1969 opinion was almost
twice as long as that of 1967, and dissents and reversals were
more frequent. The North Carolina Supreme Court came to think
of itself as a lawmaking and policymaking court .. .[that] con-
sidered only "truly significant questions of law."'0
During its 1993 session, the Arkansas General Assembly provided
for expansion of the court of appeals to twelve judges, effective
July 1, 1995.101 Assuming that funding is available for these new
positions, two issues arise: (1) whether this increase will enable the
supreme court to redefine its own role by routing the vast majority
Model, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 163, 171-72 (1979). Without focusing specifically on
courts of last resort, Dr. Leflar has argued that the upper limit for an appellate
judge is "35, or conceivably 40, full-scale publishable opinions" each year. "Even
the most learned and facile judge could not write more without the risk of writing
shoddy opinions and shirking other duties. . " LEFLAR. supra note 11, at 9.
98. Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,
30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131 (1977). During the most recent four-year period for
which statistics are available, the annual average was 16.5 opinions per justice,
excluding per curiam opinions. Henry C. Martin, Statistical Compilation of the
Opinions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina Terms 1989-90 through 1992-
93, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1994).
99. In 1992, for example, the average in New Jersey was 11.1, while the Oregon
average was 16.6. Other states in this range included California (12.7), Missouri
(16.0), Washington (15.0), and Wisconsin (12.4). See STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7, at 94-96.
100. Kagan et al., supra note 98, at 131-32; see also Roger D. Groot, The Effects
of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme Court Work Product: The
North Carolina Experience, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 548, 572 (1971) (observing
that the supreme court, "previously operating under tremendous burdens, has begun
to operate more effectively and is achieving a position of true leadership in the
legal development of the state").
101. Act of Apr. 13, 1993, No. 1085, § 1, 1993 Ark. Acts 3275, 3276 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-101(c) (Michie 1994)).
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of cases to the court of appeals; and (2) if so, whether this real-
location of appellate workload will be possible under the operating
procedures established for the court of appeals by statute.
The first issue must be considered in light of the fact that the
court of appeals presently has a very heavy workload. Each of the
court's six judges averages about 11I majority opinions annually,
and each year the court disposes of approximately 188 cases per
judge. 10 2 Even for an intermediate appellate court whose primary
function is error-correction, these numbers are high. It has been
suggested that, on an annual basis, the "realistic maximum" for
courts of this type is 100 cases per judge, although many courts
dispose of substantially more.'0 3 This does not mean that each judge
is expected to write 100 opinions per year; rather, the figure refers
to the number of cases that the court handles on a per-judge basis.
Had six new judges been added to the court of appeals prior
to fiscal year 1992-93, its workload would have been 94 cases per
judge,°4 just below the "realistic maximum." A similar workload
can be anticipated, at least initially, if the size of the court is
increased as scheduled in 1995. This expansion would also give the
judges an opportunity to reduce the court's backlog. However, if
a workload level of 100 cases per judge were to be established for
the court of appeals, the supreme court would be required to hear
a substantial number of cases in the first instance and would thus
lack the flexibility to make its own docket largely discretionary.
Nonetheless, a system that assigned almost all cases to a twelve-
judge court of appeals as an initial matter would produce a workload
that is significantly lower than that of the present six-member court.
Statistics from fiscal year 1992-93 are illustrative. During that twelve-
102. These figures are based on statistics from the last three fiscal years for
which data is available: 1990-91, 1991-92, and 1992-93. During that period, the
court on average disposed of 1,130 appeals per year (188.3 per judge) and produced
668 signed majority opinions (111.3 per judge). About sixty percent of the cases
terminated without opinion were appeals from the Employment Security Division,
with the remaining forty percent about equally divided between dismissals and
transfers. See ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6,
at 5; ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1991-92), supra note 39, at 5;
ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1990-91), supra note 39, at 5.
103. Martineau, supra note 97, at 172; accord CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note
62, at 143 (suggesting limit of 300 dispositions per year for each three-judge panel,
or 100 per judge); Richard S. Brown, Allocation of Cases in a Two-Tiered Appellate
Structure: The Wisconsin Experience and Beyond, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 189, 190
(1985) (same); Hopkins, supra note 68, at 463 (same).
104. There were 1,129 appeals filed in the court of appeals during 1992-93.
ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6, at 5. With a
court of twelve judges, the average per judge would be 94.08.
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month period, 514 appeals were filed in the supreme court and 1,129
in the court of appeals. 05 If a twelve-member court of appeals had
disposed of all 1,643 cases, its workload would have been 137 per
judge - an average in excess of the "realistic maximum" but
substantially lower than the present average and well within the
range of intermediate appellate courts in other states. °6 Of course,
the court's workload would be reduced by the number of cases that
the supreme court might hear in the first instance, either via direct
assignment of a class of cases or under one of the allocation methods
discussed in Part IV of this article. Moreover, the intermediate court
might implement - or, where necessary, ask the supreme court or
the General Assembly to adopt - techniques to streamline the
appellate process.
10 7
Therefore, expansion of the court of appeals to twelve judges
would enable the supreme court to reallocate cases between the two
courts and make its own docket discretionary. The court of appeals
would still face a backlog, but its lower per-judge workload would
permit the court to chip away at that problem over time. A move
to add more than six judges to the court would probably not be
politically feasible, particularly in light of the fact that other states
105. ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT (1992-93), supra note 6, at 1, 5.
106. For example, the 1992 average in Indiana was 138.4 cases per judge, while
the average in Alaska was 172.3. Others in the same ballpark include Massachusetts
(158.0) and Minnesota (144.9). In the states that surround Arkansas, the average
was better: Kansas (69.6), Louisiana (54.7), Missouri (113.8), Oklahoma (116.6),
Tennessee (106.7), and Texas (116.0). In Mississippi, which has no intermediate
appellate court, the supreme court's average was 96.9. These averages are derived
from the disposition totals in STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT
f 992, supra note 7, at 68-77.
107. These techniques might include summary disposition, "fast track" appeals,
mandatory settlement conferences in civil cases, sanctions for frivolous appeals,
greater reliance on law clerks or staff attorneys, and use of temporary judges. See
Susan A. FitzGibbon, Appellate Settlement Conference Programs: A Case Study,
1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 57; Timothy E. Gammon, The Central Staff Attorneys' Office
in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit: A Five-Year Report, 29
S.D. L. REV. 457 (1984); Roger A. Hanson, An Assessment of Florida's Fourth
District Court of Appeal's Settlement Conference Program, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
177 (1990); Doyal E. McLemore, Jr., Appellate Delay Reduction: An Organized
Approach, 33 JUDGES' J. 28 (1994); John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals:
The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859; Thomas B. Marvell, The New Mexico Court of Appeals
Summary Calendar: An Evaluation, 22 N. M. L. REv. 501 (1992); Marvell, supra
note 93; Mills, supra note 68; John M. Perry, The Fast Track: Accelerated Dis-
positions of Civil Appeals in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 6 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 453 (1981); Philip A. Talmadge, Toward a Reduction of Washington Appellate
Court Caseloads and More Effective Use of Appellate Resources, 21 GONZ. L.
REV. 21 (1985-86).
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of similar size and similar caseloads typically do not have intermediate
appellate courts with more than twelve members. 0 Moreover, unless
the court is expanded in multiples of six judges, the present judicial
districts would have to be redrawn.1°9
If it funds the six new judgeships for the court of appeals, the
General Assembly will also need to revise statutes governing the
court's operating procedures before the supreme court can make
wholesale changes in Rule 1-2. Since 1983, the court of appeals has
been authorized by statute to sit in two three-judge panels called
"divisions.""10 If a panel decision is not unanimous, the case "shall
be submitted to the court en banc for decision." '' Under the
statutory scheme that will take effect on July 1, 1995, the court
will be organized into four three-judge panels." 2 The requirement
of panel unanimity will remain in effect, but en banc consideration
will no longer be necessary in the event of a dissent. Instead, the
case is to be resubmitted to six of the court's twelve judges - the
original panel plus one of the others - for decision." 3
108. Kansas, for example, has a ten-judge intermediate appellate court. The
state's population is about 2.5 million, and its appellate filings for both the supreme
court and court of appeals totaled 1,573 in 1992. By way of comparison, Arkansas,
with about 2.4 million people, had total appellate filings of 1,533 during the same
period. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7,
at 68, 70.
109. A bill introduced early in the 1995 legislative session would reduce the
number of court of appeals districts from six to four, with the new boundaries
tracking the state's four congressional districts. Three judges would be elected from
each district. S. 199, §§ 1, 3-4, 80th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995).
110. Act of Mar. 13, 1983, No. 410, §§ 1-2, 1983 Ark. Acts 687, 687-88 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-109 (Michie 1994) (effective until July 1, 1995)). The
General Assembly took this step "[tjo assist the court of appeals in meeting its
case load. .. ." In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n Comm., 303 Ark. 752, 798 S.W.2d 923
(1990). The legislation that created the court pursuant to Amendment 58 made no
provision for panel decisions and apparently contemplated that all cases would be
heard en banc. See Act of Feb. 23, 1979, No. 208, 1979 Ark. Acts 467 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-12-101 to -108 (Michie 1994)).
111. Act of Mar. 13, 1983, No. 410, § 3, 1983 Ark. Acts 687, 688 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-113 (Michie 1994) (effective until July 1, 1995)).
112. Act of Apr. 13, 1993, No. 1085, § 7, 1993 Ark. Acts 3275, 3278-79 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-109 (Michie 1994) (effective July 1, 1995)).
113. Id. § 10, at 3279-80 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-12-113 (Michie 1994)
(effective July 1, 1995)). If there is a tie vote, "the decision appealed from shall
be affirmed." Id. Of course, the possibility of tie votes exists under the current
law. For an interesting discussion of one problem that arises when the judges are
split down the middle, see Robert Laurence, A Very Short Article on the Precedential
Value of the Opinions from an Equally Divided Court, 37 ARK. L. REV. 418
(1984). While the supreme court may grant review under Rule 1-2(0(3) when the
court of appeals is equally divided, it need not do so. Perkins v. Perkins, 267
Ark. 112, 113, 589 S.W.2d 29, 30 (1979); see also Farmer v. Everett, 279 Ark.
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Obviously, this requirement will result in some cases being heard
by six judges rather than three." 4 By assigning more judicial resources
to particular appeals, the statute will decrease the court's flexibility
and threaten its ability to handle an expanded caseload. If the court
is to achieve maximum productivity, the basic decisional unit must
be the three-judge panel, regardless of whether there is unanimity
among its members in a given case. Reliance on those panels could
increase the possibility of inconsistent decisions; however, that pos-
sibility also exists under the 1995 scheme, since it contains no
provision for en banc review. More importantly, "further review by
the supreme court is an adequate means of resolving decisional
conflicts" among panels." 5
In addition, there are methods to minimize the potential for
such conflicts. For example, a simple rule that one panel is bound
by the prior decision of another panel goes a long way toward
eliminating inconsistent decisions, ' 6 as does a requirement that panel
decisions be circulated among all members of the court prior to
issuance." 7 Rotation of judges among the panels on a regular basis
361, 651 S.W.2d 99 (1983) (dismissing petition for review as "imprudently granted");
Kelley v. State, 278 Ark. 497, 646 S.W.2d 703 (1983) (declining to hear case
involving constitutional issue where court of appeals had affirmed by a tie vote).
The supreme court observed recently that it has "traditionally granted certiorari
for the review of tie-vote court of appeals' decisions that affirm a judgment of
the trial court." Ferguson v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 307 Ark. 452,
453, 821 S.W.2d 30, 31 (1991). As one of my colleagues has pointed out, however,
"[i]t is something of a stretch to find a 'tradition' of review here," since the
justices have granted review in only seventeen of sixty-eight such cases - about
twenty-five percent. Robert Laurence, Four Observations and an Inquiry about the
Practice and Frequency of Dissenting Votes by the Judges of the Arkansas Court
of Appeals, 1994 ARK. L. NoTEs 89, 91-92 n.3 [hereinafter Laurence, Four Ob-
servations and an Inquiry].
114. Any attempt to predict the number of cases that would fall into this category
is fraught with difficulty and, in any event, well beyond the author's statistical
skills. It has been suggested, however, that judges serving on the court of appeals
since adoption of the present statutory requirement in 1983 "have tempered their
dissents in order to avoid the administrative inconvenience of having to sit en
banc." Laurence, Four Observations and an Inquiry, supra note 113, at 93 n.7.
115. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 11 (com-
mentary to § 3.01). Generally, a mechanism for en banc review "is essential in
the federal courts of appeals but unnecessary and inappropriate in most state
appellate courts systems." STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note
60.
116. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 11-12. This
rule is followed by most federal appellate courts. E.g., In re Hammond, 27 F.3d
52, 57 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Wright, 22 F.3d 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1994);
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. AMX Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1993).
117. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 61
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also helps promote consistency."' These considerations favor a uni-
tary structure, i.e., a court with statewide jurisdiction that sits at
a central location, rather than a system based on geographical lines
and fixed panels.119
Apart from these matters, there is some doubt as to whether
the statutory resubmission requirement is constitutional under the
separation of powers doctrine. 20 Arguably, the General Assembly's
(commentary to § 3.36); LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 71. This technique has been
used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. See Peter S. Popovich, Ten Years Later:
Justice Delayed is No More, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 581, 585 (1993). No
mechanism exists to resolve conflict between panels of that state's intermediate
court, but practicing lawyers have found "no great inconsistency" in its decisions.
David F. Herr & Mary R. Vasaly, Appellate Practice in Minnesota: A Decade of
Experience with the Court of Appeals, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 657 (1993).
118. See Paul H. Anderson, Reflections on the Future of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 569, 577 n.15 (1993); LEFLAR, supra note
11, at 71; Popovich, supra note 117, at 585. The ABA standards call for a change
in the composition of panels at least once a year. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
COURTS, supra note 60, § 3.01(b), at 7. Other techniques to maintain consistency
have also been suggested. For example, the court's staff attorneys could monitor
incoming cases so that those involving the same issue can be assigned to the same
panel or notice can be given to a panel that the same issue is involved in another
case. The staff lawyers might also review all opinions prior to publication to identify
conflicts. If conflicts are found, they may be resolved, without the necessity of
an en banc hearing, by reconsideration or joint deliberation among the panels.
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 61 (commentary to
§ 3.36).
119. See LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 71; Hufstedler, supra note 66, at 601. As
Dr. Leflar has noted, a unitary system, coupled with regular rotation of panels,
prevents forum shopping. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 73. Moreover, a unitary structure
poses fewer administrative difficulties, requires a smaller staff, ensures an even
distribution of the appellate workload, permits easy expansion of the court, and
avoids political battles over regional units. Hufstedler, supra note 66, at 601. These
considerations notwithstanding, a bill introduced in the 1995 legislative session
would split the court of appeals into four three-judge divisions serving districts
that parallel the state's four congressional districts. Each three-judge panel would
be permanently assigned to its geographic division and would hear on appeal only
those cases that were originally filed in counties within the division. The four panels
would be located in El Dorado, Fayetteville, Jonesboro, and Little Rock. S. 199,
§§ 1, 6-9, 80th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995). Proponents of territorial
appellate courts argue that this arrangement provides "accessibility of the appeals
process to state residents" by reducing "travel, cost, and time involved in appealing
the case from a trial court." Karrenberg & Watkiss, supra note 96, at 130 (quoting
from M. OSTHUS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS 2 (1976)). This accessibility
can also be provided, however, if judges serving on a centralized court regularly
sit around the state to hear cases. See Popovich, supra note 117, at 585.
120. The Arkansas Constitution contains explicit separation of powers language,
providing for "three distinct departments," none of which "shall exercise any power
belonging to . . . the others." ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2. As the supreme court
has observed, "Neither of the three departments of government is subordinate to
the other and neither can arrogate to itself any control over either one of the
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authority under Amendment 58 to "establish a court of appeals and
divisions thereof" carries with it the power to limit these panels to
cases where the three judges are unanimous. Indeed, the supreme
court seemed to say as much in a 1984 case upholding the validity
of the present statute requiring panel unanimity.' On the other
hand, Amendment 58 expressly gives the supreme court "general
superintending control" over the court of appeals and the authority
to determine its jurisdiction. Any attempt by the General Assembly
to place restrictions on the ability of the panels to hear cases would
appear to infringe on the supreme court's powers with respect to
appellate jurisdiction and supervisory control. The decision mentioned
above sheds no light on this issue, but subsequent cases suggest that
the supreme court has expansive constitutional and inherent authority
with respect to the workings of the state's courts.122
IV. MODELS FOR CASE ALLOCATION
With a twelve-member court of appeals that hears all cases in
panels of three judges, the supreme court would be able to assign
the great majority of appeals to that body and devote its own
resources to those that present opportunities for law development
or issues of public interest. The question then becomes: how should
the supreme court go about implementing such a system?
Under the most common approach, appeals are taken to the
intermediate appellate court in the first instance, with a few cases
- such as those that impose the death penalty or raise constitutional
questions - possibly reserved for direct review by the highest court.1
23
others in matters which have been confided by the constitution to such other
department." Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 462, 592 S.W.2d 100, 104 (1979);
see aso Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 215, 662 S.W.2d
826, 827 (1984) (noting that exception in Freedom of Information Act exempting
from disclosure any documents protected by order or rule of court "prevents any
entanglement in the separation of powers doctrine").
121. Citizens Bank v. Estate of Pettyjohn, 282 Ark. 222, 667 S.W.2d 657 (1984).
The court concluded: "We hold that Act 410 of 1983, authorizing the court of
appeals to sit in divisions of three and authorizing either division to affirm or
reverse a case by a unanimous decision, is a valid exercise of legislative authority
as contemplated by Amendment 58." Id. at 227, 667 S.W.2d at 660.
122. See, e.g., Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992); State
v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 800 S.W.2d 402 (1990); see also Morton Gitelman & John
J. Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence,
and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 ARK. L. NOTES 27; Kala R. Holt, The
Balance of Power: Weidrick v. Arnold and the Conflict over Legislative and Judicial
Rulemaking Authority in Arkansas, 46 ARK. L. REv. 627 (1993).
123. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, § 3.10(b),
(d), at 13-14 (initial appellate review should lie in intermediate court; however,
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In any event, the vast majority of appeals are filed in the intermediate
court, where, as Dr. Leflar has put it, "they are somehow sorted
out." ' 24 This process can take several forms.
The American Bar Association's standards for appellate courts
favor an arrangement giving the highest court discretion to review
any decision of the intermediate body. 25 Critics of this two-tiered
structure have argued that it results in wasteful and costly "double
appeals" that cause further delay in the appellate process. 26 Other
commentators, however, downplay this problem, pointing to statistics
suggesting that about forty percent of the cases decided by inter-
mediate courts are appealed to courts of last resort, with only about
fifteen percent of those actually accepted for review. 27 As a result,
no more than five percent of intermediate court decisions in most
states receive full-scale supreme court review. 128 While these figures
are based on data from the early 1980s, and are thus rather dated,
they are consistent with recent statistics from Minnesota. In 1992,
seventy-three percent of all appellate cases ended in the state's court
of appeals, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review in
only four percent of the others.
129
In addition, problems of delay and expense seem overstated.
The extra expense is typically slight in the vast majority of cases,
because review is denied. When a second appeal does occur, steps
can be taken to contain costs; for example, the parties might be
required to resubmit the briefs filed in the intermediate court, with
direct appeal of right may be provided to court of last resort in death penalty
cases, and that court should have discretion to review directly "cases of great and
immediate public importance").
124. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 75.
125. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, § 3.10(c), at
13-14. The commentary to this section identifies "two basic mechanisms" for
invoking the court's discretion: petition by a party or certification by the intermediate
court. The latter "should be effective only when it has reached its own decision,
so that the certification procedure may not be employed as a means of shifting
that court's decisional responsibilities to the higher court." STANDARDS RELATING
TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at 17 (commentary to § 3.10(c)).
126. See LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 75-76; Brown, supra note 103, at 205-07.
127. Marvell, supra note 93, at 88. The fifteen percent figure cited in the text
represents the median; overall, the percentages vary from eight to twenty-five percent.
Marvell, supra note 93, at 88.
128. Marvell, supra note 93, at 88.
129. Anderson, supra note 118, at 570-71. The author, chief judge of the in-
termediate court, added that these statistics "eliminat[e] the concern that the court
would merely be an additional, intermediate stop adding to the delay of finality."
Anderson, supra note 118, at 571; see also Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary
Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate Courts: A Comparison of
Florida's System with Those of the Other States and the Federal System, 45 FLA.
L. REV. 21, 30 (1993) (concluding that a two-tier appellate system "results in a
significant workload savings" and "shift[s] the time-consuming review-for-correct-
ness function to the court of appeals").
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opportunity for supplementation when warranted. Similarly, delay
is likely to be minimal when a petition for review is denied, par-
ticularly because there is typically no oral argument or written
opinion. Consequently, the possibility of significant delay would
arise only when a case is accepted for supreme court review. Even
then, it has been suggested that the total time in both courts "is
probably less than the time in an overburdened high court if no
intermediate court existed." 13 0
More importantly, a double appeal need not be considered a
liability. An initial decision by the intermediate court can sharpen
the issues, explore the case from a perspective considerably different
from that of counsel, and otherwise serve as a laboratory for the
highest court."' As Chief Justice Stone once observed:
I should deplore any direct appeal to the supreme court. The
public little realizes how much is accomplished by passing through
an intermediate court - the clash of counsel, the preparation
of briefs and judicial decision, before the case comes to the
supreme court often does much to clarify the question and the
minds of court and counsel in dealing with it .... 112
The foregoing comments do not address what may be a more
serious problem with the double appeal, namely, the time that an
intermediate court must devote to cases which, because they are
potentially significant in terms of law development, are most likely
to be reviewed by the supreme court. If the intermediate court must
tackle these appeals in the first instance, it has less time remaining
for the "error correction" cases for which it is best suited.,33 More-
over, law development cases will presumably take longer to decide
and require more detailed work than those that involve only error
correction. "Despite this expenditure of resources, a petition for
review to the highest court often ensues."' ' 34
Not surprisingly, there are variations on or alternatives to the
ABA model. At least four approaches have been identified: bypass,
reach-down, certification, and deflection. 35 The bypass mechanism
130. Marvell, supra note 93, at 89.
131. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 68, at 473; Hufstedler, supra note 66, at
600-01.
132. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 386
(1956).
133. See Brown, supra note 103, at 206-07.
134. Brown, supra note 103, at 190-91.
135. Brown, supra note 103, at 209. The author of this article, an intermediate
court judge in Wisconsin, surveyed the twenty-eight states that had two-tier appellate
court systems in 1983. Brown, supra note 103, at 209 n.91. The described methods
are sometimes referred to by different names. Brown, supra note 103, at 209.
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gives the parties an opportunity to seek initial review by the highest
court, thus circumventing the court of appeals. Standing alone, the
bypass mechanism is not considered particularly effective; the litigants
themselves must invoke the discretion of the supreme court, which
is likely to have little inclination for hearing appeals in the first
instance. 36 Under the reach-down approach, the highest court may
on its own motion shift a court of appeals case to its own calendar.
As a method of case allocation, a reach-down system requires the
members of the supreme court, a committee thereof, or staff at-
torneys to screen for possible transfer all appeals filed in the in-
termediate court. 
137
Certification places the screening burden on the intermediate
court rather than the supreme court. After reviewing the cases,
perhaps with the assistance of staff attorneys, the judges on the
intermediate court certify the most important cases to the supreme
court for decision on the merits. 3 ' If judges on the intermediate
court screen the cases without the involvement of staff attorneys,
certification then has an advantage over the reach-down approach:
judges should be better-equipped than staff "to identify those cases
136. Brown, supra note 103, at 212. Several states have bypass provisions. See,
e.g., ARIZ. R. CIv. APP. P. 19(b); Ky. R. Civ. P. 74.02(1)-(4); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 480A.10(2)(a) (West 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-201(d)(1), (2) (1994); WASH.
R. ApP. P. 4.3.
137. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211A, § 10 (West 1986 & Supp.
1994). Judge Brown identified Massachusetts as one state in which reach-down is
employed to allocate cases. Brown, supra note 103, at 213-15. Courts of last resort
in several other states, including Arkansas, also have reach-down authority but
apparently do not use it as a means of case allocation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§
12-3-14 to -15 (1986); ARIZ. R. Civ. APP. P. 19(0; ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(c); CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 12(a); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-109(3) (West 1989); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199(c) (West 1985); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 302(b); Mo. CONST.
art. V, § 10; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.10(2)(b) (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-5-8(B) (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-201(d)(3) (1994); WASH. R.
APP. P. 4.3. Under the Arkansas rule, the supreme court "may transfer to the
supreme court any case appealed to the court of appeals." ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-
2(c).
138. Brown, supra note 103, at 217-19. The ABA standards recognize certification
as an appropriate mechanism for presenting cases that the intermediate court has
decided to the court of last resort for discretionary review. See supra note 125.
In contrast, the method discussed in the text is predecisional. Several states, including
Arkansas, authorize predecisional certification, though apparently not as part of
a general screening process undertaken for purposes of case allocation. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.015(b) (1988); ARIZ. R. APP. P. 19(c); ARK. SuP. CT. R.
1-2(d); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-109 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-
3016 (1988); Ky. R. Civ. P. 74.02; MD. CT. R. 8-304; MINN. STAT. ANN. §
480A.10(2)(b) (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(C) (Michie 1990); OR. REV.
STAT. § 19.210 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.255 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-
2-2(3)(b), 78-2a-3(3) (Supp. 1994).
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which should be allocated to the highest court."'3 9 Largely for this
reason, intermediate court judges in Florida play a significant role
in that state's certification system.' 40
Dr. Leflar has described certification as the procedure that
"appears to afford maximum realization of the useful purposes for
which intermediate courts are typically established.' ' 4' However, he
has cautioned that certification requires that "the interrelationships
between the intermediate court and the top court [must] be intel-
ligently planned and not allowed to develop haphazardly."'' 42 If the
criteria for certifying cases is not clear, delay may result as cases
are bounced from one court to the other.
43
139. Brown, supra note 103, at 219. While staff attorneys must rely on the
briefs (only the appellant's brief in some systems), the intermediate court judges
could certify the case at a later point, even after oral argument or during the
opinion-writing process. Brown, supra note 103, at 219.
140. Certification is available in Florida both before and after an intermediate
court decision. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4), (5). With respect to predecisional
or "pass-through" certification, the intermediate court certifies that the pending
appeal is "of great public importance" or will "have a great effect on the proper
administration of justice throughout the state" and, in either case, requires "im-
mediate resolution by the supreme court." For its part, the supreme court has
discretion as to whether to accept jurisdiction. Id. § 3(b)(5). See generally Ben F.
Overton, District Courts of Appeal: Courts of Final Jurisdiction with Two New
Responsibilities - An Expanded Power to Certify Questions and Authority to Sit
En Banc, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 80 (1983). It appears, however, that predecisional
certification has not been frequently used. Cope, supra note 129, at 34-35.
In discussing the Florida system, Judge Overton pointed out that use of staff
attorneys or law clerks to make screening decisions "has' been criticized as placing
substantial power in sometimes young and inexperienced lawyer personnel." Overton,
supra, at 83; see also Mary L. Stow & Harold J. Spaeth, Centralized Research
Staff." Is There a Monster in the Judicial Closet?, 75 JUDICATURE 216 (1992)
(suggesting that some appellate courts rely too heavily on staff).
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong about providing judges with staff
assistance. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, sunra note 60, § 3.62.
at 96-97 (discussing role of law clerks and staff attorneys). As Dr. Leflar has
pointed out, staff attorneys can be useful in a number of areas, including the case
allocation process: "It would not be well for judges to relinquish all responsibility
for screening, but there is no necessity for them to do all the work involved in
it." LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 89. The specter of delegation is not a problem if
judges retain "the two inherent functions of the appellate decisional process: (1)
assuring justice under the law to the litigating parties, and (2) keeping the law in
order." LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 94; see also STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
COURTS, supra note 60, at 99 (commentary to § 3.62) (stating that courts must
"guard against any tendency to rely on staff for decisions that should be made
only by judges personally").
141. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 77.
142. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 77.
143. The criteria might, for example, specifically identify cases that are candidates
for certification. These could include: cases that present issues of substantial public
importance or interest; cases which, if decided in accordance with current trends,
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Certification seems particularly effective when combined with
the bypass and reach-down methods. That is, the supreme court
may assume jurisdiction over cases filed initially in the intermediate
court not only upon certification from that body, but also on its
own motion or on that of a party. As one commentator has written:
Enormous flexibility is built into the system. . . . This permits
the circumstances of the individual case, rather than any arbitrary
classification made in advance, to be the determining factor in
which cases the supreme court will hear. This procedure eliminates
any possibility of an appeal being taken to the wrong court -
all appeals must go to the court of appeals - but the court of
appeals can be bypassed when appropriate. 44
An arrangement of this type would be workable in Arkansas.
If, as suggested in Part III, an expanded court of appeals sitting
in three-judge panels would be able to decide the vast majority of
the cases now being filed in Arkansas, then it obviously could screen
those cases for purposes of allocation. As an intermediate court
judge from Wisconsin has pointed out:
[wiriting a certification takes less time than writing a decision
because the panel is merely shaping the legal issues for the high
court [to] review [rather than] actually deciding the case and
giving reasoned elaboration in support.
45
The time savings would be particularly significant with respect to
law development cases, which would be certified to the supreme
court for decision. By referring these appeals, the court of appeals
might be in conflict with a prior decision of the supreme court; cases in which
the intermediate court seeks revision of the law; cases in which supreme court
review seems likely; cases that should be decided quickly in the interest of justice;
cases that present the same or similar issues as a case pending in the supreme
court; cases that reveal a need to interpret an opinion previously issued by the
supreme court; cases that present issues of first impression; and criminal cases that
involve the death penalty, life sentences, or egregious felonies. Brown, supra note
103, at 223-31; see also Cope, supra note 129, at 45-62 (discussing commonly used
criteria for discretionary review).
144. Martineau, supra note 97, at 174. Writing in 1979, Professor Martineau
described the Wisconsin scheme, which was adopted in 1978 upon creation of an
intermediate court. In practice, however, the system did not work well. As Judge
Brown pointed out in 1985, litigants infrequently filed motions asking for immediate
supreme court review. Brown, supra note 103, at 208. Moreover, the supreme court
did not take cases sua sponte, and there was apparently no mechanism whereby
the court could screen cases for possible transfer. Thus, certification was the method
most often employed. Brown, supra note 103, at 208.
145. Brown, supra note 103, at 221.
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would not be required to spend its time dealing with important legal
issues that the supreme court would likely consider on further review.
In addition, the number of double appeals would drop substantially.
The fourth approach, deflection, has many of the same benefits
as certification but operates in a mechanically different fashion.
Under this system, all appeals are initially filed in the supreme court
which screens and allocates the cases to the intermediate appellate
court.'14 Because the supreme court makes the allocation decision,
law development cases remain at the top rung of the judicial system
while error correction cases are assigned to the intermediate court.
If the appeals are properly allocated at the outset, decisions of the
intermediate court will not require further appellate consideration. 47
As Dr. Leflar has pointed out, this system "is based on the
assumption that the top court allocates cases in a thoughtfully
informed manner, that it is honest in not attempting to turn difficult
or disagreeable cases over to the other court."'' 4 Its major defect,
he has argued, is that all cases must be reviewed by the supreme
court: "Even the most efficient staff screening, with an accurate
identification of the issues posed in every case, cannot replace this
time-consuming duty.' ' 49 For this reason, it has been suggested that
deflection is best suited for states that have a relatively low number
of appellate filings. 50
At least five states now employ the deflection method: Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.' However, only Iowa
and Oklahoma have caseload levels that permit meaningful com-
parison to Arkansas. In 1992, there were 1,398 appeals filed in the
Iowa Supreme Court and 1,509 appeals filed in the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. 5 2 By way of comparison, 1,643 appeals were filed
146. L -LAz, supra note 11, at 74-75. Judge Brown calls this system "deflection."
Brown, supra note 103, at 209.
147. Brown, supra note 103, at 210.
148. LEnLAR, supra note 11, at 75.
149. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at 75.
150. Brown, supra note 103, at 211; Robert L. Stern, Remedies for Appellate
Overloads: The Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE 103, 104 (1988).
151. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-5(8) (1985); HAW. R. APP. P. 31; IDAHO CODE
§ 1-2406 (1990); IDAHO R. APP. P. 108; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 602.4102, 602.5103
(West 1988); IOWA SuP. CT. R. 4; IOWA R. App. P. 401; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 30.1 (West 1991); OKLA. R. Crv. App. P. 1.16(F), 1.204(11); S.C. R. APP.
CT. 214. The'Arkansas Supreme Court may transfer to the court of appeals any
case appealed to the supreme court. ARK. SuP. CT. R. 1-2(c). However, this
provision is not used as a case allocation device.
152. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7,
at 70, 76. The 1992 statistics for the other states are as follows: Hawaii (five
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in the two Arkansas appellate courts during fiscal year 1992-93.15
If all of these cases were initially filed in the supreme court, it
would have a screening load somewhat higher than its counterparts
in Iowa and Oklahoma. However, the number of cases to be screened
would drop substantially if appeals from the Employment Security
Division (ESD) automatically transferred to the court of appeals. 5 4
For example, of the 1,643 appeals filed in 1992-93, 317 were ESD
cases. Assuming that all would be assigned to the court of appeals,
the number of cases filed in the supreme court would be 1,326, a
manageable total in light of the experience in Iowa and Oklahoma.'"
As a practical matter, however, it seems that the supreme court
could cope with deflection only by delegating what Dr. Leflar called
the "time-consuming duty" of screening to a rotating panel of three
justices, perhaps with the assistance of staff attorneys. Iowa uses
this method, with a three-judge panel making the assignment decision
after initial review of the cases by staff attorneys. 5 6 This approach
might be criticized because it does not involve the entire court in
the screening process and could lead to heavy reliance on staff
recommendations. Moreover, the need to rotate panel members reg-
ularly could result in the allocation of cases in an inconsistent manner.
While these concerns should not simply be brushed aside, they
do not seem sufficient to scuttle the deflection technique. Indeed,
the potential problems can be addressed by court rules and internal
operating procedures. In Iowa, for instance, a rule identifies the
types of cases that are "ordinarily" retained by the high court,
judges, 541 cases, 108.2 per judge); Idaho (five judges, 400 cases, 80 per judge);
South Carolina (five judges, 587 cases, 117.4 per judge). STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 7, at 68, 72. It should be noted that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has jurisdiction only in civil cases. The state's court
of last resort in criminal matters is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 40 (West 1991).
153. See supra note 7.
154. Iowa has adopted this procedure in cases involving termination of the parent-
child relationship. These appeals have been exempted from the screening process
and are transferred directly to the court of appeals. IOWA R. App. P., Division
XI, Supervisory Directive.
155. Because both the Iowa and Oklahoma supreme courts have nine members,
their per-judge averages would be lower than that of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Using the appellate filings mentioned in the text, the Iowa and Oklahoma averages
would be 155.3 and 167.7, respectively, while the Arkansas average would be 189.4,
excluding ESD cases.
156. IowA SUP. CT. R. 4(a), (b); see also IOWA R. App. P. 401. In Hawaii,
the chief justice of the supreme court, or a judge from that court or the intermediate
court designated by the chief justice, is charged with assigning the cases to one
court or the other. HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-5(8) (1985); HAW. R. App. P. 31.
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including cases that involve the constitutionality of a statute, ques-
tions of first impression, and matters of "broad public importance
requiring prompt or ultimate determination by the supreme court.
1 7
Staff attorneys prepare "case statements" that describe the "status,
facts and legal issues" involved in each appeal and recommend "the
routing of the case consistent with criteria set forth by rule for the
transfer of proceedings to the court of appeals."' 58 Supreme court
rules make clear that these recommendations "are tentative only,"
and that all assignment decisions shall be made by a panel consisting
of three justices.5 9 Moreover, the chief justice may apparently direct
by supervisory order that cases be screened by another method or
that panel decisions be reviewed by the entire court.' 6°
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that expansion of the court of appeals to twelve
members, coupled with changes in the statutory scheme and the
method of case allocation, would permit the supreme court to focus
primarily on law development, which is the primary task of a court
of last resort. Proper allocation, either via the deflection approach
or the certification method described above, would also enhance
certainty because "[a] single definitive statement on a significant
legal question would emanate from the highest court in the first
instance." 161
Deflection seems more likely to prevent double appeals and is
certainly consistent with the supreme court's supervisory duties under
Amendment 58. In the long run, however, this approach would
probably require the supreme court to turn to staff attorneys for
assistance in the screening process. Certification has the advantage
of placing the allocation decision primarily in the hands of judges,
but the potential for inappropriate or inconsistent case allocation
exists Unl t111 certi ication cr ite r Given t
potential for confusion, particularly at the outset, certification should
157. IOWA R. APP. P. 401(b), (c).
158. IowA SuP. CT. R. 4(a).
159. IOWA Sup. CT. R. 4(a), (b). This rule is consistent with Dr. Leflar's
admonition that "staff attorneys must understand that they are not deciding cases
but only providing materials to help the judges in that task." LEFLAR, supra note
11, at 85. The ABA standards provide that "the role of legal staff [should] be
particularly described in the published statement of the court's internal operating
procedures. ... " STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 60, at
99 (commentary to § 3.62); see also supra note 140.
160. IOWA SuP. CT. R. 4(b).
161. Brown, supra note 103, at 191-92.
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be supplemented with reach-down and bypass procedures that enable
the supreme court to transfer a case to its docket sua sponte or
upon motion. On balance, this system seems preferable given the
additional personnel costs associated with deflection.'
62
Regardless of which of the two allocation methods is utilized,
a mechanism should be established by which some appeals, such as
death penalty cases, are heard in the first instance by the supreme
court, while others, such as ESD cases, are heard by the court of
appeals.' 63 Moreover, discretionary supreme court review should be
available for all cases decided by the court of appeals. Even with
the most efficient screening system, some significant cases are bound
to be erroneously assigned to the court of appeals at the outset,
and on some occasions the law development potential of a particular
case might not become apparent until the intermediate court is in
the midst of the opinion-writing process.
162. This recommendation is similar but not identical to that of a subcommittee
of the Arkansas Judicial Council's long range planning committee. According to
the subcommittee:
The method preferred . . . is to have all cases, other than capital felony
cases and those involving interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution,
assigned to the court of appeals. The supreme court should have the
authority to bring the record up in cases when it is convinced by petition
of a party, or certification by the court of appeals, that an important
matter of "law development" is at stake.
[This] method is preferred because the time of neither court would be
spent in screening all of the cases, and the parties would have the op-
portunity to persuade the supreme court to take a case. The guidance of
counsel could be very significant in exercising the Court's discretion.
REPORT OF THE APPELLATE COURTS SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 5.
163. As noted previously, the ABA standards indicate that direct appeals of right
to the court of last resort are appropriate in death penalty cases. See supra note
123; see also supra note 162 (quoting report of Arkansas Judicial Council sub-
committee recommending that capital felony cases and those involving questions
of state constitutional law be appealed directly to the supreme court). Some cases
must be heard by the supreme court as a matter of constitutional law. For instance,
the court has original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs, such as certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 3. These writs "are designed
for the appropriate exercise of [the court's supervisory] jurisdiction, where appellate
remedy is unavailable or inadequate." State ex rel. Purcell v. Nelson, 246 Ark.
210, 215, 438 S.W.2d 33, 37 (1969). Another example is the couri's "original and
exclusive jurisdiction" over cases involving the sufficiency of statewide petitions to
amend the constitution or adopt a statute. ARK. CONST. amend. 7; see, e.g.,
Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994).
Other election cases, however, are initially brought in chancery and may presumably
be appealed to either the supreme court or the court of appeals. Under the present
allocation scheme, all election cases are assigned to the supreme court. ARK. Sup.
CT. R. 1-2(a)(7); see, e.g., Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d 10
(1994) (involving constitutional amendment proposed by General Assembly).
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In any event, the Arkansas appellate system is ripe for change.
The court of appeals is facing a significant backlog, and the supreme
court is struggling to keep its docket current. Neither long delay
nor harried decision-making, both of which are present to some
degree in the current system, is acceptable. As the familiar saying
goes, "justice delayed is justice denied." At the same time, however,
"justice rushed is justice crushed."'6 The state and its citizens deserve
appellate courts that not only process cases efficiently, but also
decide them correctly in a well-reasoned manner that enables the
law to grow. The proposals set out above would be a step in this
direction.
164. Marvell, supra note 93, at 47.
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